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ABSTRACT
We consider policy evaluations when SUTVA is violated because of the presence of in-
terference among units. We propose to explicitly model interactions as a function of units
characteristics. Our approach is applied to the evaluation of a policy implemented in Tuscany
(a region in Italy) on small handicraft firms. Results show that the benefits from the policy are
reduced when treated firms are subject to high levels of interference. Moreover, the average
causal effect is slightly underestimated when interference is ignored. These findings point to
the importance of considering possible interference among units when evaluating and planning
policy interventions.
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1 Introduction
Regional and national development policies are an important tool for setting up and supporting
local enterprise. Most countries spend significant amounts of money on programs intended to
promote R&D investments (Takalo et al., 2013). The justification for this support comes from
the correction of market failures arising from the fact that social returns to R&D activities are
greater than private returns making the market allocation of these resources sub-optimal (Duch
et al., 2009). Incentives to private investment in R&D are usually allocated in the form of tax
incentives, credits or direct funding of innovation programs.
Many business policy evaluation studies employ the potential outcome framework to eval-
uate the causal effect of policy interventions or programs on productivity, investments, returns
on capital, sales or employment (e.g., Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Battistin et al., 2001; Pel-
legrini and Carlucci, 2003; Bronzini and De Blasio, 2006). Under this framework, different
statistical techniques (such as, for example, matching) are used to estimate what the supported
firms would have experienced had they not been supported and compare it with the factual out-
come (see Klette et al., 2000, for a survey). A standard assumption in these evaluation studies,
even if often it is not made explicit, is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA).
SUTVA combines the “no-interference” assumption that one unit’s treatment assignment does
not affect another unit’s potential outcomes with the assumption that there are “no hidden ver-
sions” of the treatment (Rubin, 1980, 1990). The “no hidden versions” assumption implies
that there are no unrepresented treatments, and we maintain this assumption throughout. The
no-interference assumption is a critical component of SUTVA and in many settings, it may be
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untenable. In studies aimed at evaluating programs that provide services or financial assistance
to firms, firms operating in the same geographical area and/or sector of activity are likely to
interact each other, and so a treatment received by one firm may affect its competitors’ potential
outcomes.
In the literature, research on drawing inference on causal effects in the presence of interfer-
ence is not yet common, although some exceptions exist (see, e.g., Verbitsky and Raudenbush,
2004; Sobel, 2006; Rosenbaum, 2007; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Tchetgen Tchetgen and
VanderWeele, 2012; Kao et al., 2012). However, most of the existing works are theoretical
and/or focus on randomized experiments. Applications in the context of observational studies
addressing violation of SUTVA are somewhat rare (one example is Hong and Raudenbush,
2006).
In this paper, we propose a simple approach to draw inference on causal effects in obser-
vational studies accounting for the presence of interference. As a motivating example we use
data from a policy intervention implemented in Tuscany, a region in central Italy. The inter-
vention consists of a set of programs, named “Programs for the Development of Crafts (PDC)”
(Regional Law n.36, 4/4/95), and it is targeted at artisans firms with registered office in Tus-
cany. The main objective of the program incentive is to ease access to credit by making it
less costly, in order to improve firm performances in terms of investment policies, employment
levels and sales. Most Tuscan artisan firms are small-sized, and generally operate in a limited
geographical area. Therefore, they plausibly interact each other, casting considerable doubt on
the scientific validity of inference that would be drawn under the “no-interference” assumption.
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In some contexts it is reasonable to assume that interactions are limited within well-defined
groups. In these situations, one approach to overcome violations of the “no-interference” as-
sumption is to conduct the analysis at the minimum aggregate level for which SUTVA is plau-
sible. For example, Stuart (2007) argues that when evaluating educational interventions, the
“no-interference” assumption may be more reasonable in school-level analyses than in student-
level analyses. In business incentives policy evaluations, several studies use local areas as units
of analysis (e.g., De Castris and Pellegrini, 2012). However this approach does not allow one
to estimate micro-level effects of the policy.
Similarly to the previous approach but maintaining the analysis at the micro level, some
studies assumed that interactions are limited to units within groups, with the intensity of the
interactions being constant within the same group (e.g., Hong and Raudenbush, 2006). Instead,
we address violation of the “no-interference” assumption by explicitly modeling interactions
among units. In our empirical application this approach involves specifying which firms in-
teract with each other, and the relative magnitudes of these interactions. We extend previous
approaches by allowing the intensity of interactions to depends on a distance metric, based
on firms’ characteristics, namely, size and geographical location. This idea is in line with the
extensive literature on social interactions (see, for instance, Brock and Durlauf, 2001, for a
survey), where interactions are often found to be stronger for geographically, or economically,
or socially close units.
Our approach consists of a three-step procedure. In the first step, we use propensity score
matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Imbens, 2004) to create a
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matched data set so that the group of untreated firms is as similar as possible to the treatment
group in terms of the distribution of pretreatment covariates. In the second step, for each firm
in the matched dataset we estimate the interference with other firms as function of its own and
its competitors’ characteristics. Finally, in the third step, we use a regression model to estimate
the causal effect of the policy intervention taking into account interference. As suggested by
Ho et al. (2007), combining a matching preprocessing of the data with regression analysis, as
done here, should improve inference because estimates of causal effects are less dependent on
modeling assumptions and specifications.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the potential outcome ap-
proach to causal inference and formally define the Stable Unit treatment Assumption (SUTVA).
In Section 3 we briefly review some of the approaches proposed in the literature to address
violations of the no-interference component of SUTVA and describe our approach explicitly
formulating the key assumptions and defining the causal estimands of interest. In Section4 we
apply the proposed approach to our motivating example. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Potential Outcomes Framework and the SUTVA
Consider a group of firms, index by i = 1, . . . , N and suppose we want to assess the causal
effect of receiving a given benefit. Let Ti be a binary treatment indicator, taking on value
1 for firms that received the benefit (treated/assisted firms) and 0 for those that did not re-
ceive the benefit (control/non-assisted firms). Let T be the N−dimensional vector of assign-
ments with ith element Ti, and let T−i be the vector of assignments with Ti removed. Let
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Yi(T ) ≡ Yi(Ti,T−i) denote the potential outcome for firm i (e.g., number of employees, sales,
production innovation) given the treatment vector T . In the potential outcome framework,
SUTVA is an usually invoked assumption. SUTVA rules out hidden versions of treatments as
well as interference between units. Formally,
Assumption 1 (SUTVA, Rubin, 1980, 1990)
If Ti = T ′i , then Yi(T ) = Yi(T
′) for all T ,T ′ ∈ {0, 1}N
SUTVA allows us to write Yi(Ti,T−i) as Yi(Ti). Therefore, under SUTVA, for each firm
there exist just two potential outcomes, Yi(0) and Yi(1).
In the context of the evaluation of policy interventions targeted on firms, the “no hidden
versions of treatments” assumption means that the same treatment is administered to all units
in the treatment group (and likewise for the control group). This component of SUTVA is vi-
olated, for example, in evaluation studies that only distinguish beneficiary and non-beneficiary
firms in the presence of different amounts or types of benefits allocated to firms. In such a
case Yi(1) is not stable because it will depend on which amount or type of benefit is chosen. A
solution would be to consider the treatment to be multi-valued (Imbens, 2000; Lechner, 2001)
or continuous (Hirano and Imbens, 2004; Imai and Van Dyk, 2004), instead of considering it
as binary. For example, Bia and Mattei (2012) apply the generalized propensity score method-
ology to estimate the effect on occupational levels of the amount of contribution received by
firms. On the other hand, the “no interference” component of SUTVA assumes that potential
outcomes for each firm do not depend on the treatment assignment of the other firms.
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The “no interference” assumption is plausible in many applications, but there are also many
cases in which interactions between units are a major concern and the assumption is not plau-
sible (Sobel, 2006; Rosenbaum, 2007; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008) 1. In business policy eval-
uation, it is reasonable to think that firms operating in the same geographical area and sector of
activity are likely to compete for scarce resources (e.g., credits) and customers. This implies
that a policy intervention assigning an incentive to a firm may affect also the performance of
its competitors, violating the no-interference assumption. Here, we stress the importance of
considering possible interference among firms in development policy evaluation studies. We
maintain the “no hidden versions of treatments” assumption and consider a binary treatment
(receiving versus not receiving a benefit). However, our approach can be extended to multival-
ued or continuous treatments.
In some settings, interference is a nuisance while in other settings it defines the effects of
interest. In many business policy evaluation studies firms not receiving support may be still
affected by the programs due to spillover effects, which are often the main justification for
R&D subsidies. Measuring the magnitude of the generated spillovers is by itself a crucial part
of evaluating the programs in these cases (Eberhardt et al., 2013; Klette et al., 2000; Takalo
et al., 2013).
Our focus will be on the evaluation of the causal effect of a policy intervention for treated
firms in the presence of interactions and not on the quantification of the effects of the inter-
1See Greiner and Rubin (2011) for a discussion of SUTVA, the possible violation of its components and ways
of relaxing them in the context of the evaluation of the causal effect of the perception of immutable characteristics.
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actions per se2. However, we shall notice that by considering different levels of interference
we can define interesting causal estimands above and beyond the standard average treatment
effect.
3 Causal Inference in the Presence of Interference
Without imposing the no-interference assumption potential outcomes for each firm do not only
depend on its treatment assignment but also on the treatment assignment of all the other N −
1 firms. Therefore for each firm, potential outcomes are not two anymore, but 2N . In this
setup, an individual causal effect may be defined as a comparison between any two potential
outcomes: Yi(Ti,T−i) versus Yi(T ′i ,T
′
−i), Ti, T
′
i ∈ {0, 1}, and T−i,T ′−i ∈ {0, 1}(N−1).
To address the complications due to completely relax the no-interference assumption, in
the following we introduce alternative weaker versions of the no-interference assumption and
develop a framework to account for differential strength of interference a unit can be subject
to.
3.1 Restricting the Interference within Activity Sectors
In business policy evaluation studies, it is plausible to assume that interference among firms is
limited within activity sectors. We introduce some additional notation in order to account for
firms’ activity sector. Let K be the number of activity sectors and denote by Nj the number of
firms in sector j, j = 1, . . . , K. The vector of treatment assignments T can be conveniently
2For an interesting approach to the measurement of spillover effects see Kao et al. (2012)
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decomposed as follows: T = [T (1), . . . ,T (K)]tr, where T (j) = (T (j)ij ,T
(j)
−ij), and ij represents
firm i in sector j3.
The following assumption implies that interference is limited among firms in the same
sector of activity, i.e. the SUTVA holds only with respect to firms in different sectors:
Assumption 2
If T (j) = T ′(j), then Yij(T ) = Yij(T ′) for all T ,T ′ ∈ {0, 1}N
Assumption 2, defined by Sobel (2006) as partial interference, implies that Yij(T ) is equal to
Yij(T
(j)), and so each firm has 2Nj potential outcomes corresponding to alternative treatments
allocations for itself and its competitors in the same activity sector.
3.2 Modeling Interference within Activity Sectors
Hong and Raudenbush (2006) consider the estimation of the causal effect of retaining low-
achieving children in kindergarten rather than promoting them to first grade. They argue that a
student’s learning outcome can be affected by the treatments assigned to other students. So, for
example, the retention effect on a student may depend on the proportion of peers retained at the
same time. Hong and Raudenbush (2006) relax the standard SUTVA by assuming that interfer-
ence is limited within school and that peer effects can be summarized through the proportion
of retained students in the school. Similarly, in our context, we could assume that interference
only depends on the proportion of treated firms in each sector. Formally,
3In this paper we use square brackets to denote an ordered sequence of vectors and round brackets for a
collection of elements. The superscript tr denotes the transpose of a vector/matrix.
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Assumption 3
If T (j)ij = T
′(j)
ij and p(T
(j)
−ij) = p(T
′(j)
−ij ) then Yij(T ) = Yij(T
′) for all T ,T ′ ∈ {0, 1}N
where p(T j−ij) is the proportion of treated firms in sector j excluded firm ij.
Assumption 3 imposes the strength of interference to be constant for all units within a
group, given their treatment status. As an alternative, we can allow interference to depend on
units’ characteristics. For instance, as noted by Wooldridge and Imbens (2009), interactions
may decline in importance depending on some distance metric, either geographical distance
or proximity in some economic sense. In our case, it is reasonable to assume that within the
same activity sector, interference depends on firms’ characteristics, such as location and some
measure of firms’ size.
Formally, we assume that for each firm ij, interference can be summarized by a m-valued
function of treatment assignments of firm ij’s competitors, T (j)−ij: f(T
(j)
−ij) = [f1(T
(j)
−ij), . . . , fm(T
(j)
−ij)]
tr,
so that, Yij(T
(j)
ij ,T
(j)
−ij) = Yij(T
(j)
ij , f(T
(j)
−ij)). Formally, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 4
If T (j)ij = T
′(j)
ij and f(T
(j)
−ij) = f(T
′(j)
−ij ), then Yij(T ) = Yij(T
′)
for all T ,T ′ ∈ {0, 1}N .
While Assumption 2 implies that potential outcomes for each firm ij depend on the whole
vector of treatment assignments in sector j, Assumption 4 attempts to model interference within
sectors.
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Alternative specifications of the function f can be considered depending on subject mat-
ter knowledge and background characteristics can be included in the specification of such a
function. Thus, under Assumption 4 the influence of competitors’ treatment assignments on
firm ij potential outcomes depends, through f , on firm ij’s competitors characteristics. Here
we focus on linear combinations of treatment assignments: fr(T
(j)
−ij) = rw
(ij)′T
(j)
−ij , where
rw
(ij) = [rw
(ij)
1j , . . . , rw
(ij)
(i−1)j, rw
(ij)
(i+1)j, . . . , rw
(ij)
Njj
] is a (Nj − 1)-dimensional vector of weights
for firm ij. A simple case is when each element of rw(ij) takes on two values, 0 and 1, de-
pending on firms’ characteristics. For instance, we might assign a zero weight to firms that are
geographically faraway from ij given some pre-specified distance threshold. This amounts to
assume that treatment assignment of firms with a zero weight does not affect firm ij’s potential
outcomes. However, this specification of the weights might be somewhat restrictive. More
generally, weights, rw(ij), can be specified as any real-value function and can also depend on
firms’ characteristics.
Specifically, letZ(j) be theNj×p−dimensional matrix of variables affecting the strength of
interference among firms in sector j, with ith row equal toZ(j)ij . Then, we assume that rw
(ij)
h =
gr(Z
(j)
ij ,Z
(j)
hj ), with h = 1, . . . , Nj , h 6= i. A downturn of this approach is that inference based
on nonparametric methods might raise serious challenges. We propose a model-based approach
that explicitly uses the weights rw
(ij)
h to account for interference.
Various causal estimands can be defined. Under Assumption 4, an average causal effect can
be defined as:
E
[
Y (T
(j)
ij , f(T
(j)
−ij))− Y (T ′(j)ij , f(T ′(j)−ij ))
]
.
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In this paper we are interested in average causal effects for the treated (ATT, e.g., Imbens,
2004), which can be generally defined as follows:
E
[
Y (T
(j)
ij , f(T
(j)
−ij))− Y (T ′(j)ij , f(T ′(j)−ij )) | T (j)ij = 1
]
.
Specifically, we focus on the following estimands:
τ(f ∗)=E
[
Y (T
(j)
ij , f(T
(j)
−ij))− Y (T ′(j)ij , f(T ′(j)−ij )) | T (j)ij = 1, f(T (j)−ij) = f(T ′(j)−ij ) = f ∗
]
, (1)
and
τ = E
[
E
[
Y (T
(j)
ij , f(T
(j)
−ij))− Y (T ′(j)ij , f(T ′(j)−ij )) | T (j)ij = 1, f(T (j)−ij) = f(T ′(j)−ij ) = f
]]
, (2)
where the outer expectation in Equation (2) is over the distribution of the interference function,
f .
The estimand in Equation (1) represents the effect of the policy under a pre-fixed level of in-
terference, f ∗. The variability of these effects with respect to different values of f ∗ will indicate
to what extent different levels of interference affect the possibly beneficial effects of the policy.
Evidence on heterogeneity of these effects could be useful to plan future policy interventions.
For example, if the policy benefit is reduced because of the presence of geographically close
treated competitors, then the policy maker could introduce some geographical constraints in
the future allocation of benefits. The estimand in Equation (2) is the (marginal) average causal
effect of the treatment, and it is the estimand of main interest if interference is merely viewed
as a nuisance factor.
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4 Estimation of the Impact of Financial Aids to Tuscan Firms
4.1 Programs for the Development of Crafts in Tuscany (Italy)
With the goal of promoting innovation and regional development, the Tuscan Regional Admin-
istration (Italy) in collaboration with “ArtigianCredito Toscano,” a consortium aimed at easing
the access to credit for small firms, introduced the “Programs for the Development of Crafts
(PDC)” (Regional Law n.36, 4/4/95), targeted at Tuscan small-sized handicraft firms. Access
to PDC was based on eligibility criteria and a voluntary application by firms. The eligibility
criteria required firms to plan an investment project involving costs above a pre-fixed thresh-
old, which varied across programs and over years. Beneficiary firms were selected on the basis
of a score, accounting for both firms’ characteristics and the quality of the investment project
proposal.
The main objective of the program incentive was to ease access to credit by making it less
costly, in order to improve firm performances in terms of investment policies, employment
levels and sales.
The first PDC calls, published in 2001 and 2002, provided subsidies without requiring any
refund or interest payment. This type of financial aid raised various issues. The lack of a
commitment to refund boosted an extremely high number of firms to apply. As the access
criteria were not very tight, also firms that applied proposing low-quality investment projects
received a grant. Moreover, access to 2001/02 programs required that the investment project
for which firms applied for a grant were ongoing at the moment of the application. This access
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rule implied that most of applicant firms had already received some financial support from a
lending institution at the moment of application.
The numerous drawbacks of the 2001/02 PDC led to modify the grant assignment rules in
2003: the grant type was changed from subsidies to soft-loans and the minimum investment
cost was increased. In 2003, the minimum admissible investment cost was 12 500 Euros and the
grant covered 70% of the financed investment. In 2004 these thresholds were slightly changed:
the minimum admissible investment cost was increased to 25 000 Euros, and the percentage of
the financed investment covered by the grant was reduced to 60%. The grants were distributed
using a revolving fund in the form of interest-free grants one-off upon request from the assisted
firms, given either a bank guarantee or the final investment financial statement.
From an economic perspective, soft loans are more advisable than capital grants, in the
sense that with the same amount of public funds, the loans allow the government to provide
incentives to a much larger number of assisted firms, generating a greater leverage. In fact the
new grant allocation rule was successful: Among firms participating in the PDC between 2003
and 2005 only a few projects were not funded and the percentage of insolvencies was really
low (lower than 3%). Also, previous studies found that the post 2003 PDC had statistically
significant positive effects on firms’ performance. Conversely, the 2001/02 PDC were found to
have small and statistically negligible effects (Mattei and Mauro, 2007). We have information
on assisted firms that participated in the program either before 2003 (2001/02 PDC) or between
2003 and 2005 (2003/05 PDC). However, given the advantages of the grant allocation rule of
the post 2003 PDC and the results from previous impact evaluation studies on the PDC, we will
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focus on the 2003/05 PDC henceforth.
4.2 Data
We use an integrated data set, including longitudinal information on the PDC in Tuscany, col-
lected by “ArtigianCredito Toscano,” and a wealth of information on firms’ characteristics com-
ing from administrative archives provided by the Chamber of Commerce (2001 − 2004) and
by the Internal Revenue Service (2002), and from an “ad hoc” telephone survey (see Mattei
and Mauro, 2007, for details on the survey). The survey was conducted on a sample of 119
assisted firms (participating in 2003/05 PDC) and of 721 non-assisted firms, in order to gather
additional information, such as 2005 outcome variables of firms’ performances (number of
employees, sales, production innovation).
In our analysis we focus on a subsample of firms. We first select firms operating in the fol-
lowing 4 economic activity sectors: Manufacturing activities (D); Construction (F); Wholesale
and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, and personal and household goods
(G); and Real estate business, rental services, computer, research, business services (K). It is
worth noting that these four economic activity sectors comprise the most of the Tuscan artisan
firms. In fact only a very small number of firms in our sample operate in economic activity
sectors different from those we select. We also discard 23 assisted firms and 135 non-assisted
firms with missing values on relevant variables. The selection procedure leads to a sample of
94 assisted firms and 528 non-assisted firms.
Firms’ decision to apply for public assistance, as well as the selection mechanism operated
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by the authorities, implies that the benefits are not randomly allocated. In fact, there is substan-
tial imbalance in the distributions of several characteristics between assisted and non-assisted
firms: the initial absolute standardized percent bias (ABS, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) is
greater than 20% for 11 out of 29 covariates, and greater than 30% for 5 covariates including
pretreatment number of employees (see Table 1). In our observational study, however, we can
reasonably assume strong ignorability of the treatment conditional on observed covariates, i.e.,
conditional independence of potential outcomes on the treatment assignment given pretreat-
ment covariates (e.g., Imbens, 2004).
Under strong ignorability we employ a matching strategy to select a group of control units
such that the distribution of pretreatment characteristics for the treated and matched control
groups are as similar as possible. We investigated alternative matching procedures, including
coarsened exact matching with alternative coarsening of covariates (Blackwell et al., 2009;
Iacus et al., 2012) and propensity score matching with different specifications of the propen-
sity score model and different matching algorithms. We selected the matching procedure that
guaranteed the best average ASB and a satisfactory ASB for important covariates (such as
pretreatment sales). In particular, we selected a subset of 94 non-assisted firms using one-to
one nearest neighbour propensity score matching (without replacement) combined with exact
matching on sector of activity.
As it can be seen in Table 1, the ASB after matching is dramatically reduced for most of
the covariates and overall the matching solution was quite satisfactory. However, imbalance
remains in some pretreatment variables. To adjust for such residual imbalance, we control for
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pretreatment variables in the regression-based analyses implemented on the sample of treated
and matched control firms to estimate the causal effects of interest.
Our main substantive objective is to evaluate the effects of the PDC on employment levels,
accounting for the presence of interference. Employment is a key component of the market, and
a policy that is effective in increasing firms’ labor demand may be worthwhile from a socio-
economic perspective. Alternative outcome variables, such as sales and production innovation,
can be considered, but they suffer from the presence of a large proportion of missing data,
which may compromise the study, substantially complicating the analysis. The evaluation
of the effects of the PDC on those outcome variables accounting for both the presence of
interference as well as missingness will be a valuable topic for future research.
4.3 Modeling Interference among Tuscan Small-Handicraft Firms
Tuscany is a region in the center of Italy consisting of 10 provinces: Arezzo, Firenze, Grosseto,
Livorno, Lucca, Massa-Carrara, Pisa, Pistoia, Prato, Siena. Figure 1 shows the borders of the
provinces in Tuscany with the distribution of the assisted firms and matched firms classified
by economic activity sector. Note that firms’ geographical location refers to their registered
office, although the vast majority of the firms in our sample only have one branch. The most
noticeable pattern in the maps is that most of the firms operating in the economic activity sector
D are located in the north and north-east of Tuscany (especially in the provinces of Arezzo,
Firenze, Prato and Pistoia) and are relatively close to one another.
The geographical distribution of firms operating in the other economic activity sectors is
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more sparse, although the provinces in the north/north-east of Tuscany are still those where
more firms concentrate. In the analyses, we aggregated some geographically contiguous provinces
with a small number of firms in our sample.
Tuscany is traditionally a land of small-sized companies and individual traders, and firms
operating in the same market usually have similar needs, interests, and knowledge, especially
if they are located relatively nearby. These features of the Tuscan business market suggest
that providing a benefit to one firm can also affect the outcomes of others and interactions
are expected to be stronger among geographically close firms and to mainly affect firms that
are smaller according to some measure of size. In fact, firms’ performance may be strongly
influenced by the policy choices of their competitors, especially if competitors’ size is bigger.
In our application study we use pretreatment sales as measure of firm size and assume that
interference depends on pretreatment sales and geographical location. Formally, we set m = 2
and fr(T
(j)
−ij) = rw
(ij)trT
(j)
−ij , r = 1, 2, where the weights, rw
(ij)tr, r = 1, 2, are defined as
follows. Let Zij1 be pretreatment sales for firm ij and let Z
(1)
ij2 and Z
(2)
ij2 be the pair of variables
measuring UTM (Universal Transverse Mercator) coordinates for firm ij.
The weights 1w(ij)tr and 2w(ij)tr are respectively based on the Canberra distance between
sales and the Euclidean distance between UTM coordinates. Formally, let 1d
(ij)
hj denote the
Canberra distance between sales of firm ij and sales of firm hj, h 6= i.:
1d
(ij)
hj =
| Zij1 − Zhj1 |
Zij1 + Zhj1
.
We choose the Canberra distance because it allows us to standardize with respect to the total
size of the firms being compared. An element 1w
(ij)
hj of the vectors of weights 1w
(ij)tr is defined
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as follows:
1w
(ij)
hj =

1 + 1d
(ij)
hj if Zhj1 ≥ Zij1
1− 1d(ij)hj if Zhj1 < Zij1.
This type of weighting implies that if firm hj is bigger (smaller) than firm ij, then its weight
in the function f1 for firm ij increases (decreases) with the difference between the size of the
two firms. The weight of firm hj is one if it has the same size as firm ij.
Similarly, let 2d
(ij)
hj be the Euclidean distance between the UTM coordinates of firm ij and
the UTM coordinates of firm hj, h 6= i. An element 2w(ij)hj of the vector of weights 2w(ij)
′ is
defined as the reciprocal of the Euclidean distance between the UTM coordinates of firm ij and
the UTM coordinates of firm hj, h 6= i: 2w(ij)hj = 1/2d(ij)hj .
The rationale behind this system of weights is that for each firm the interference will be
stronger the higher is the number of treated competitors which are geographically close and
have higher sales levels.
Let T obs = [T (1),obs, . . . ,T (K),obs]tr be the vector of treatments intakes, where T (j),obs =
(T
(j),obs
ij ,T
(j),obs
−ij ), and let Y
obs
ij be the actual outcome (number of employees) for firm ij in
sector j. We standardized the observed values of the interference functions f1(T
(j),obs
−ij ) and
f2(T
(j),obs
−ij ) using their means and standard deviations within sectors: Let f r(T
(j),obs
−ij ) denote
the within sector standardized interference function fr, r = 1, 2. Then, we model the condi-
tional expectation of Y obsij given T
obs
ij , f r(T
(j),obs
−ij ), r = 1, 2 andXij as a flexible function of its
19
arguments. Formally,
E[Y obsij |T (j),obsij , f 1(T (j),obs−ij ), f 2(T (j),obs−ij ),Xij] = α0 + α1T (j),obsij + α2f 1(T (j),obs−ij )+ (3)
α3f 2(T
(j),obs
−ij ) + α4T
(j),obs
ij f 1(T
(j),obs
−ij ) + α5T
(j),obs
ij f 2(T
(j),obs
−ij ) +Xijβ.
Under strong ignorability and Model (3),
E
[
Y (T
(j)
ij , f(T
(j)
−ij))− Y (T ′(j)ij , f(T ′(j)−ij ))
]
=[
α1T
(j)
ij + α2f 1(T
(j)
−ij) + α3f 2(T
(j)
−ij) + α4T
(j)
ij f 1(T
(j)
−ij) + α5T
(j)
ij f 2(T
(j)
−ij)
]
−[
α1T
′(j)
ij + α2f 1(T
′(j)
−ij ) + α3f 2(T
′(j)
−ij ) + α4T
′(j)
ij f 1(T
′(j)
−ij ) + α5T
′(j)
ij f 2(T
′(j)
−ij )
]
.
We estimate the model parameters by ordinary least squares: Let αˆ`, ` = 0, 1, . . . , 5, and
βˆ the ordinary least squares estimates of the model parameters. Given the estimated pa-
rameters, causal effects and their standard errors can be easily estimated using the estimat-
ing equation. For instance, the average causal effect for a given allocation of the assignment
T = [T (1), . . . ,T (K)]′ and a pre-fixed interference level f ∗, i.e., the causal estimand in Equa-
tion (1), is estimated as
τˆ(f ∗) = αˆ1 + αˆ4f ∗1 + αˆ5f
∗
2 ,
and its standard error is estimated as
ˆs.e.(τˆ(f ∗)) =√
Vˆ(αˆ1)+(f ∗1 )2Vˆ(αˆ4)+(f ∗2 )2Vˆ(αˆ5)+2f ∗1 Ĉov(αˆ1, αˆ4)+2f ∗2 Ĉov(αˆ1, αˆ5)+2f ∗1 f ∗2 Ĉov(αˆ4, αˆ5).
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4.4 Results
The first two columns in Table 2 show parameter estimates of the conditional distribution of
number of employees given treatment status and covariates:
E[Y obsij |T (j),obsij ,Xij] = γ0 + γ1T (j),obsij +Xijβ.
Under SUTVA, the coefficient on the treatment indicator in this outcome model, γ1, is the
causal effect of interest. Its estimate is 1.37 (se = 0.62) suggesting a positive and statistically
significant impact of the policy intervention. The estimated effect is also substantially quite
strong given that the pretreatment average number of employees is about 10 for assisted firms
before the implementation of the policy. The last two columns of Table 2 show parameter esti-
mates of the conditional distribution of number of employees taking into account interference
(Equation (3)).
The observed (standardized) values of the interference function based on the geographical
distance, f1, ranges from −0.94 to 5.50 with median equal to −0.27, and the observed (stan-
dardized) values of the interference function based on the sales distance, f2, ranges from−1.88
to 2.40 with median equal to −0.055. Although the estimated coefficients of the interference
functions and of their interactions with the treatment indicator are statistically negligible, there
is some evidence that the association between number of employees and interference is nega-
tive.
Figures 2 and 3 present our main results. Figure 2 consists of two parts showing the es-
timated τ(f ∗) effects and their 95% point-wise confidence bands derived (a) fixing the in-
terference function based on the sales distance at its observed median value and ranging the
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interference function based on the geographical distance over its observed percentiles; and (b)
fixing the interference function based on the geographical distance at its observed median value
and ranging the interference function based on the sale distance over its observed percentiles.
Most of the estimated causal effects are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level:
the 95% confidence bands do not cover zero over most of the range of the interference func-
tions. Specifically, for interference levels based on the geographical distance lower than 1.6
(the 95th percentile), the estimated average causal effects are a statistically significant increase
of employment levels ranging between 0.82 units and 1.28 units. Similarly, for interference
levels based on sales lower than 1.0 (the 82th percentile), the estimated average causal effects
indicate a statistically significant increase of employment levels ranging between 0.44 units
and 2.26 units. However, the highest effects are estimated under minimum levels of interfer-
ence, and as the strength of interference increases, the estimated τ(f ∗) effects steady reduce.
Extreme values (greater than the observed 95th percentile) of the interference function based
on the geographical distance lead to small and non-significant effects. The consequences of
large interference levels based on sales are even more dramatic: the estimated τ(f ∗) effects
reach also negative values for interference levels based on sales greater than the observed 94th
percentile (1.68), although the estimated standard errors suggest these negative point estimates
are statistically negligible.
Jointly ranging the interference functions over their observed percentiles (see Figure 3) fur-
ther stresses the role of interference, clearly showing that the impact of PDC steady decreases
as the strength of interference increases. Most of the estimated effects are positive and statis-
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tically significant (estimated standard errors are omitted), suggesting that PDC are effective in
increasing employment levels, even in the presence of interference. However, in the presence
of high levels of interference the estimated effects become small and statistically negligible,
clearly highlighting that ignoring interference may lead to misleading results.
The estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated we obtain integrating out the
interference functions, the causal effect τ in Equation (2), is positive and statistically significant
( τˆ = 1.08, se = 0.16), but it is slightly smaller than the model-based estimate of the ATT effect
under SUTVA.
In general the presence of interference seems to reduce the size of the effect. In fact the
ATT effects estimated accounting for the presence of interference are generally smaller than
the ATT effects estimated under SUTVA, unless interference is really small. These results are
consistent with the idea that the beneficial effect of the policy for a firm is reduced when its
competitors are also treated, highlighting that the impact of interference can be considerable
and should not be neglected.
4.4.1 A Small Simulation Experiment
Previous results are based on the distribution of the interference functions as resulting from the
observed allocation of treatment and firms characteristics. In order to investigate how the in-
terference functions and treatment effects vary over the assignment distribution, we conducted
a small simulation study where we estimate the treatment effects of interest under various al-
locations of the treatment but maintaining fixed the firms characteristics. We assume that a
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completely randomized experiment is conducted, where the number of firms assigned to re-
ceive a benefit is fixed to 94, the observed number of assisted firms. Formally, we randomly
draw K = 10 000 N -dimensional vectors with NT = 94 ones and N − 94 = 94 zeros from
the set of
(
N
NT
)
possible treatment vectors. For each draw from this set, we first calculate the
(standardized) interference functions, f(T (j)−ij), and then we estimate τ(f
∗), with f ∗ fixed at the
median value of f(T (j)−ij) over the firms assigned to treatment.
Table 3 shows summary statistics of the medians of the interference functions over the sim-
ulated assignment distribution. The medians indicate low to moderate levels of interference.
The distributions of the medians generated by the treatment allocations are centered on negative
values and have a small variability, implying that most of the medians are negative. Consis-
tently, the estimated τ(f ∗) effects are relatively stable, ranging from 1.01 (s.e. = 0.16) to 1.38
(s.e. = 0.18). Nevertheless, Figure 4, showing the estimated τ(f ∗) effects for each of the
K = 10 000 treatment allocations, gives a clear message, that is, the presence of interference
can strongly affect the evaluation results.
In line with the results described above, Figure 4 suggests that the beneficial effect of the
policy is higher, the lower the strength of interference. In our specific study, the interference
function based on the sale distance seems to play a key role: the τ(f ∗) effects reach their
minimum values in the presence of high levels of the interference function based on the sale
distance. Therefore, an allocation of treatments that does not account for the distribution of
sales among assisted firms may reduce or even vanish the expected benefits of the policy.
As a general message, these results highlight that given budget constrains, which neces-
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sarily limit the number of assisted firms, firms’ characteristics and the features of the business
market, policy makers could make a policy intervention more effective, generating an higher
average treatment effect if they apply allocation rules that keep interference into account.
5 Concluding remarks
The aim of this article was to discuss the violation of SUTVA, a standard assumption in the po-
tential outcome literature, due to interference among units in the context of policy evaluations
targeted on firms. Previous evaluations studies in this area uncritically used SUTVA either im-
plicitly or explicitly. In general, applied papers trying to relax the standard SUTVA are very
rare. Similarly to these limited works, we assume that SUTVA holds across groups (sectors
of activity), while it may be violated within groups. However, contrary to previous attempts
of relaxing SUTVA, we allow interference within groups to vary for each unit. In particular,
we propose a framework where potential outcomes for each firm may depend on the treatment
assignment of other firms in the same activity sector with the strength of interference being a
function of firms’ characteristics, such as geographical distance between firms and firms’ size
(as measured by pretreatment sales). With minor modifications this approach could be applied
in different contexts by adequately specifying the weights entering the interference function.
It is also worth noting that our approach does not require the existence of different groups.
If, for example, firms may be partially competing with firms in different sectors this can be
taken into account by assigning a non-zero weights also to firms in different sectors.
As illustrative example, we applied our approach to the evaluation of the effect of soft-
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loans provided to Tuscan artisans firms in 2003/2004 on employment levels in 2005. Given the
characteristics of the Tuscan labor market, where most artisan firms are small-sized and gen-
erally operate in a limited geographical area, it was crucial to consider possible interference
among firms. By allowing for interference, in addition the standard average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT), it was possible to consider another interesting causal estimand: the causal
effect of receiving the benefit (versus not receiving it) given a certain level of interference.
By varying the level of interference, we find that the beneficial effect of the policy is highly
heterogeneous. In particular, our findings show that the effect of the treatment is decreasing
as interference increase. This happens both when we increase the level of interference due to
having geographically close treated competitors as well as when interference increases because
treated competitors are bigger in size. However, the average effect of the policy is positive and
statistically significant for most of the levels of interference. Only in the presence of very high
levels of interference the average treatment effect become statistically insignificant. Finally,
we find that the average causal effect of the policy intervention is substantial and statistically
significant. However, when we allow for interference, the ATT is lower than the same ef-
fect estimated under the standard SUTVA. This result indicates that ignoring SUTVA may not
only hide heterogeneous effects of the policy for different interference levels but also produce
misleading estimates of the average effect of a policy.
These results suggest that policy makers should carefully account for interactions among
firms in the planning phase of a new intervention in order to define “optimal” treatment alloca-
tion rules that allow them to maximize the benefits of that intervention.
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Figure 1: Provinces of Tuscany (Italy) with the PDC assisted firms (black triangles) and the
matched firms (black circles) classified by economic activity sectors.
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Figure 2: Estimated τ(f ∗) effects and their 95% point-wise confidence bands derived (a) fixing
the interference function based on the sales distance at its observed median value and ranging
the interference function based on the geographical distance over its observed percentiles; and
(b) fixing the interference function based on the geographical distance at its observed median
value and ranging the interference function based on the sale distance over its observed per-
centiles.
−
1
0
1
2
3
−1 0 1 2 3 4
−
1
0
1
2
3
−2 −1 0 1 2 3
(a) (b)
33
Figure 3: Estimated τ(f ∗) effects derived ranging the interference functions over their observed
percentiles.
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Figure 4: Estimated τ(f ∗) effects under various allocations of the assignment with f ∗ fixed at
the median value of the interference functions over the firms assigned to treatment.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll lll l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−0.3 −0.2 −0.1
0.0 0.1
−0.4−0.2
0.00.2
1.1
1.2
1.3
f*salesf
*umt
τ(f*)
35
Table 1: Summary Statistics of covariates before and after matching
Mean
Matched %Absolute Bias
Assisted Non-Assisted Non-Assisted Before After
Variable Firms Firms Firms Matching
Economic activity sector
D 0.76 0.72 0.76 8.9 0.0
F 0.12 0.17 0.12 14.2 0.0
G 0.06 0.10 0.06 12.7 0.0
K 0.06 0.02 0.06 22.6 0.0
Province
Arezzo 0.18 0.23 0.19 12.0 2.7
Florence 0.39 0.38 0.35 2.6 8.8
Grosseto, Siena 0.06 0.05 0.12 5.4 18.5
Prato, Pistoia 0.19 0.18 0.19 4.0 0.0
Lucca, Massa, Pisa 0.17 0.16 0.15 2.0 5.8
Sales (2002)
Up to 25 000 0.02 0.03 0.02 7.8 0.0
(25 000; 50 000] 0.05 0.03 0.02 9.3 16.8
(50 000; 100 000] 0.06 0.08 0.07 5.4 4.2
(100 000; 250 000] 0.15 0.22 0.14 17.8 3.0
(250 000; 500 000] 0.14 0.25 0.13 28.9 3.1
(500 000; 1 000 000] 0.29 0.18 0.27 24.5 4.7
Greater than 1 000 000 0.29 0.20 0.35 20.2 13.7
Legal status
Individual 0.14 0.27 0.15 32.4 3.0
Partnership 0.52 0.56 0.54 7.9 4.2
Capital companies 0.34 0.17 0.31 39.1 6.8
Objective 2 or Phasing Out area 0.67 0.67 0.63 0.4 8.9
Year of start up
Before 1980 0.24 0.26 0.27 3.8 4.9
1980− 1990 0.26 0.27 0.32 3.5 14.1
1990− 2000 0.29 0.35 0.22 13.1 14.6
After 2000 0.21 0.12 0.19 25.2 5.3
Main target market (local vs international)
Local market 0.53 0.72 0.53 38.6 0.0
Main distribution channel (private vs other)
Private distribution 0.32 0.44 0.39 25.7 15.5
Gender of the owner(s): Female owner 0.50 0.34 0.55 33.0 10.6
Age of the owner(s): Young owner 0.34 0.26 0.31 17.7 6.8
Number of employees (2002) 10.05 7.75 10.55 36.2 7.0
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Table 2: Parameter estimates of conditional distribution of number of employees (reference
group for categorical variables in parenthesis).
Standard Standard
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Treatment status: T (j),obsij 1.37 0.62 1.07 0.50
Interference functions
Geographical distance: f 1(T
(j),obs
−ij ) − − 0.04 0.35
Sales distance: f 2(T
(j),obs
−ij ) − − −1.63 1.50
Interactions
T
(j),obs
ij × f 1(T (j),obs−ij ) − − −0.71 0.83
T
(j),obs
ij × f 2(T (j),obs−ij ) − − −0.18 0.43
Economic activity sector (K)
D 0.85 0.16 0.83 0.16
F −0.14 0.73 −0.15 0.78
G 0.81 1.22 0.76 1.17
Province (Lucca, Massa, Pisa)
Arezzo 0.39 1.10 0.63 1.12
Florence −0.29 0.75 −0.48 0.73
Grosseto, Siena 0.16 1.70 2.62 2.89
Prato, Pistoia 1.68 1.79 4.62 3.69
Sales 2002 (Greated than 1 000 000
Up to 25 000 1.11 1.62 4.00 3.23
(25 000; 50 000] −2.47 3.31 4.33 4.71
(50 000; 100 000] −2.90 3.01 2.97 3.81
(100 000; 250 000] −2.01 2.57 3.01 3.58
(250 000; 500 000] −2.55 2.64 1.48 2.62
(500 000; 1 000 000] −2.07 2.12 0.69 1.83
Legal status (Individual)
Partnership −2.29 1.78 −0.46 1.34
Capital companies 0.20 0.85 0.27 0.85
Objective 2 or Phasing Out area 0.45 1.04 0.50 1.06
Year of start up (After 2000)
Before 1980 0.37 0.76 0.31 0.78
1980− 1990 −0.26 0.73 −0.65 0.86
1990− 2000 0.80 0.69 0.44 0.70
Main target market: Local market 1.22 1.01 0.97 0.92
Main distribution channel: Private distribution 0.29 0.51 0.37 0.56
Gender of the owner(s): Female owner −1.07 0.65 −0.95 0.65
Age of the owner(s): Young owner 0.32 0.71 0.52 0.79
Number of employees (2002) 0.03 0.76 0.03 0.78
Constant 1.84 2.76 −2.33 3.70
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Table 3: Summary statistics of medians of the interference functions and the estimated τ(f ∗)
effects over 10000 simulated treatment allocations
Interference
Function Mean SD Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum
fumt −0.17 0.07 −0.52 −0.18 −0.16 −0.14 0.21
fsize −0.10 0.06 −0.40 −0.13 −0.10 −0.08 0.13
τ(f ∗) 1.17 0.04 1.01 1.15 1.17 1.20 1.38
38
